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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
MARIE WOOD and TERRY BORMAN 
individually, and additionally as the natural 
parents of MARY LORRAINE WOOD 
BORMAN, a minor, 
No. 20000927-SC 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. (Priority No. 15) 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Although the plaintiffs' brief states the issues in argumentative form, they are es-
sentially correct if stripped of their argumentative overhead. The issues in this case are: 
1. Did the District Court correctly rule that the Utah Wrongful Life Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-11-23, et seq., is constitutional under the following constitutional provi-
sions: 
a. Open courts provision of the Utah Constitution, article I, section 11. 
b. Due Process Clause of the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
and article 1, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
c. Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution and article 1, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
2, Did the District Court correctly decide that the Act also barred plaintiffs' 
informed consent claim? 
The foregoing decisions of the District Court are reviewed for correctness. "A 
statute is presumed constitutional, and 'we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of con-
stitutionality.'" Board of Commissioners of Utah State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263, 
1267 (Utah 1997) (quoting Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 
920 (Utah 1993). "[T]he party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving its inva-
lidity." Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). 
There is some support in Utah law for the proposition that statutes challenged as 
unconstitutional under the open courts provision are not entitled to the ordinary presump-
tion of validity. See Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987, 988 n.4 (Utah 1993); Currier v. 
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362-63 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The reasoning behind this posi-
tion in substance is that the right to sue protected by the open courts provision is essen-
tially a fundamental right the impairment of which is subject to heightened scrutiny. See 
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 368 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result). 
This Court has never directly addressed the question of heightened scrutiny under 
such circumstances. If such scrutiny were applied, it would be contrary to the Court's 
repeated pronouncements in open courts provision cases that the Legislature has "great 
latitude in defining, changing, and modernizing the law." Craftsman Builder's Supply v. 
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Butler Mfg., 91A P.2d 1194, 1198 (Utah 1999) (quoting Berry ex rel Berry v. Beech Air-
craft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985)). Accord, Hirpa v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 948 
P.2d 785, 792 (Utah 1997) (rights protected by open courts provision are "not always 
paramount"). 
Moreover, there seems to be little justification for elevating this constitutional 
right above others. To do so would be to send a message to the Legislature that this 
Court intends to place a roadblock in front of legislation affecting the rights and obliga-
tions of citizens to each other, and that the Court views its own opinion on the subject to 
be entitled to greater weight than that of the elected Legislature. The present case arises 
in an arena where the advancements of science are outpacing traditional legal remedies. 
Where the Legislature has taken express action in such an evolving area, the balance of 
power is better achieved by appropriate, but not unlimited, deference to the Legislature's 
decisions concerning such evolving social policy. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs assert claims for wrongful birth for the birth of Mary Lorraine Wood 
Borman, a child born with Down Syndrome (genotype TRISOMY 21), and seek a de-
claratory judgment that the Utah Wrongful Life Act, Utah Code Ann. §§78-11-23, et seq. 
(the "Act") is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs also assert a wrongful life claim on behalf of 
Mary, and claims labeled negligent infliction of emotional distress and failure to obtain 
informed consent which are also based on Mary's alleged wrongful birth. 
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RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this appeal, the University does not dispute plaintiffs' statement of 
facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is not a case where a doctor's actions caused a child to be born with defects. 
"The disorder is genetic and not the result of any injury negligently inflicted by the doc-
tor." Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528, 536 (1985), cert denied, 479 
U.S. 835 (1986). "It is incurable and was incurable from the moment of conception. 
Thus the doctor's alleged negligent failure to detect it during prenatal examination cannot 
be considered a cause of the condition by analogy to those cases in which the doctor has 
failed to make a timely diagnosis of a curable disease. The child's handicap is an inexo-
rable result of conception and birth." Id. 
The issue in this case is not whether a cause of action for wrongful birth or wrong-
ful life should be recognized in Utah. The Legislature has already made that public pol-
icy determination and prohibited such claims. The issue in this case, therefore, is only 
whether the Legislature in doing so acted within its constitutional prerogative. 
As the Legislature explicitly recognized, there are significant adverse societal con-
sequences to allowing claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life to go forward. The 
prosecution of such an action "requires that parents deny the worth of their child, thus 
placing their own values over those of the child." C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 523 
(Utah 1988) (Howe, J., dissenting). Such claims stigmatize the "defective" child. They 
place the imprimatur of law on a claim that the child's family, and society in general, 
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would be better off had the child not been born. They "denigrate[] human life" and are 
"an insidious attack on the family unit." Id. 
One cannot pass over how painful to parents and child alike an action by 
parents must be. Parents will show that they did not want the child in his condi-
tion and that he would have been aborted had it not been for the professional inat-
tentiveness of a physician or other medical person. Had they known, he never 
would have been. It is public policy obviously to encourage love and harmony in 
family relationships. Public policy which importance transcends individual dis-
putes will hardly be served by lawsuits of this character. 
Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital 117 111. 2d 230, 512 N.E.2d 691, 709 (1987) 
(Ward, J., concurring and dissenting). 
Thus, the Legislature was well within its power in passing the Act and prohibiting 
such actions. Especially where the frontiers of science and law are evolving together, as 
they are in this area, great deference should be accorded to the Legislature's decision, as 
the elected representatives of the people, to make the difficult policy questions involved. 
Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of overcoming the presumption of con-
stitutionality of the Act. They have failed to establish that in passing the Act, the Legis-
lature eliminated a legal remedy existing at the time of enactment or that the Act does not 
represent a reasonable response to a societal evil, as required to prove a violation of the 
open courts provision. They have failed to show, as required by the Due Process clauses 
of the United States and Utah constitutions, that the Act has an unlawful purpose or 
places significant obstacles in the path of a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. 
They have failed to prove they are similarly situated to but are treated differently from 
others whose rights are not burdened or that the Act is not narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest. 
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Every statute barring claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life which has been 
challenged as unconstitutional has withstood scrutiny. The Utah Wrongful Life Act is 
constitutional under both the Utah and United States Constitutions. Because plaintiffs' 
remaining claims depend upon the allegation that Mary would have been aborted, a fac-
tual basis the Act precludes, they also fail as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH WRONGFUL LIFE ACT. 
The Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Wrongful Life Act in 1983. The Act con-
tains a legislative declaration of purpose, followed by a ban on claims based upon the 
allegation that, but for the act or omission of another, a person would not have been born: 
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to 
encourage all persons to respect the right to life of all other persons, regardless of 
age, development, condition or dependency, including all handicapped persons 
and all unborn persons. 
A cause of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on be-
half of any person, based on the claim that but for the act or omission of another, a 
person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but would have 
been aborted. 
The failure or refusal of any person to prevent the live birth of a person 
shall not be a defense in any action, and shall not be considered in awarding dam-
ages or child support, or imposing a penalty, in any action. 
Utah Code Ann. §§78-11-23 through 25. 
Seven other states have enacted similar statutes. See Idaho Code § 5-334; Ind. 
Code Ann. §34-12-1-1; Minn. Stat. § 145.424; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.130; N.D. Cent. 
Code § 32-03-43; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8305; S.D. Codified Laws § 21-55-1. The Minne-
sota and Pennsylvania statutes have been challenged as unconstitutional. Both were up-
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held. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986); Dansby v. 
Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 424 Pa. Super. 549, 623 A.2d 816 (1993). 
Claims in this general area fall into three general categories. Wrongful pregnancy 
cases involve claims arising out of negligence with regard to birth control and steriliza-
tion procedures. Wrongful birth claims are asserted by parents who allege that an errone-
ous post-conception diagnosis led them to give birth to a "defective" child whom they 
would have aborted had the diagnosis been correct. Wrongful life claims are similar to 
wrongful birth claims, but are asserted by or on behalf of the defective child. See C.S. v. 
Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 506 (Utah 1988) (recognizing wrongful pregnancy claim but re-
stricting nature of recoverable damages). Wrongful life claims, in particular, are not fa-
vored. See Kassama v. Magat, 136 Md. App. 637, 767 A.2d 348, 365 (2001). 
II. THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE OPEN COURTS 
PROVISION. 
Plaintiffs assert the Act violates the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution 
because it eliminates an existing cause of action for which there is no clear social or eco-
nomic evil and fails to provide a reasonable alternative remedy. The open courts provi-
sion provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Constitution, article I, section 11. 
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The open courts provision is not an inflexible bar to the Legislature's, or the 
Court's, ability to effectuate change in the law to address changing social needs or values, 
[T]he purpose of the open courts clause was to "impose some limitation" on the 
legislature's "great latitude in defining, changing, and modernizing the law." 
Craftsman Builder's Supply v. Butler Mfg., 91A P.2d 1194, 1198 (Utah 1999) (quoting 
Berry ex rel Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985)). 
The open courts analysis recognizes that "the rights of individuals protected by the 
open courts provision must be balanced against the Legislature's need to enact laws to 
meet changing societal needs. Thus, the rights protected by the open court's provision 
are 'not always paramount,' and 'the Legislature has great latitude in defining, changing, 
and modernizing the law, and in doing so may create new rules of law and abrogate old 
ones.'" Hirpa v. IHC Hospitalsf Inc., 948 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah 1997) (citing Berry, 111 
P.2d at 676 (citation omitted)). In striking that balance, the Court has held: 
[W]e will declare a statute violative of the open courts provision only if it "is un-
reasonable and arbitrary and will not further the statutory objectives." 
To achieve the proper balance between the competing interests of allowing 
the legislature to address changing societal problems and protecting injured per-
sons, a two-step process is employed to determine whether a statute abrogating a 
cause of action or remedy violates the open courts provision: 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person an effec-
tive and reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for vindica-
tion of his constitutional interest Second, if there is no substitute or 
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action 
may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be elimi-
nated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective. 
Id. (quoting Berry at 680, 681). 
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A. The Act Does Not Abrogate an Existing Legal Remedy. 
The first step of the analysis is determination whether the Act abrogated an exist-
ing legal remedy. The open courts analysis is not applicable unless the statute in question 
"abrogates an existing legal remedy for the violation of a basic right . . . . " Ross v. 
Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added).1 
Plaintiffs assert that Utah accepted the existence of claims for wrongful birth in 
Payne ex rel Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987). Plaintiffs have overstated the 
Payne decision. Payne indeed involved a claim for wrongful birth, but the Court consid-
ered the viability of that alleged claim under a governmental immunity analysis, finding 
that the doctors were immune and affirming dismissal of the case. In doing so, the Court 
assumed but did not decide that a wrongful birth claim exists under Utah law: 
Assuming, but not deciding, that Utah jurisprudence should recognize an 
action for wrongful birth, it is necessary to determine precisely when the parents' 
cause of action accrued. 
743 P.2d at 188-89 (footnote omitted). The contention that the Utah Supreme Court de-
cided in Payne that wrongful birth was a viable cause of action in Utah is simply wrong. 
Plaintiffs assert that their claim is nothing more than a medical malpractice claim. 
This Court rejected similar reasoning in C.S. v. Nielson, 161 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988), by 
rejecting the availability of a remedy for the cost of raising a child that should not have 
Utah cases are not consistent in defining the meaning of an "existing" remedy. Ac-
cording to Ross, an "existing legal remedy" is a remedy available at common law that 
existed at the time of statehood. 920 P.2d at 1162. However, in Day v. State ex rel Dept. 
of Public Safety, 1999 UT 46 Tf 36, 980 P.2d 1171, the Court held that the issue is 
whether the abrogated remedy existed at the time the Legislature acted. 
-9-
been born. That case involved "wrongful pregnancy" resulting from a failure to inform 
the patient that a tubal ligation procedure did not prevent pregnancy in all cases. While 
the Court viewed the negligent counseling as a form of medical malpractice, the Court 
treated the case as one involving the medical condition of the mother, as distinct from a 
case in which a decision to abort an already conceived child is asserted. 767 P.2d at 508. 
The Court concluded that expenses and damages directly related to the mother's 
medical condition of pregnancy could be recovered, but rejected the notion that the cost 
of raising the child, although proximately caused by negligence, was recoverable. 767 
P.2d at 515 (plurality opinion). 
In a claim for wrongful birth, all damages depend on the assertion that the child 
should not have been born. The portion of the wrongful pregnancy claim that was re-
jected in Nielson, damage arising out of the existence of the child, is at the core of wrong-
ful birth and wrongful life claims. By holding that no remedy exists at law for the birth 
of the child, the Court decided that ordinary medical malpractice remedies do not exist in 
this area of law and strongly inferred that the core concepts of wrongful life and wrongful 
birth claims are against public policy in Utah. 
Chief Justice Hall wrote the opinion, which was joined by Justice Stewart. Justice 
Howe's dissent asserted that the claim for wrongful pregnancy should not be recognized 
even in the limited form allowed in the case. This yielded three votes against expanded 
damages. Justices Durham and Zimmerman agreed that wrongful pregnancy claims 
should be recognized, but advocated an expanded scope of recoverable damages which 
would have included certain expenses of raising the child, subject to other offsets for the 
"benefit" conferred by the birth of the child. 
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Traditional tort analysis simply does not apply when a necessary assumption is 
that the existence of life is a cognizable injury. As the North Carolina Supreme Court has 
stated: 
Courts which purport to analyze wrongful birth claims in terms of "tradi-
tional" tort analysis are able to proceed to this point [proximate cause] but no fur-
ther before their "traditional" analysis leaves all tradition behind or begins to break 
down. In order to allow recovery such courts must then take a step into entirely 
untraditional analysis by holding that the existence of a human life can constitute 
an injury cognizable at law. Far from being "traditional" tort analysis, such a step 
requires a view of human life previously unknown to the law of this jurisdiction. 
We are unwilling to take any such step because we are unwilling to say that life, 
even life with severe defects, may ever amount to a legal injury. 
Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528, 533-34 (1985), cert, denied, 479 
U.S. 835 (1986) (emphasis original). 
Traditional tort analysis does not apply. No remedy has ever existed in Utah for 
the claims plaintiffs assert here. Accordingly, the first prong of the open courts analysis 
requires that the statute be upheld, and it is unnecessary to address whether the statute is a 
reasonable means for achieving the Legislature's objectives. 
B. The Act Is a Constitutional Exercise of Legislative Power. 
Even if the Legislature had eliminated a previously existing right to recover for 
wrongful birth by passing the Act, abolition of that right would not violate the open 
courts provision. 
Nowhere in this state's jurisprudence is it suggested that article I, section 
11 flatly prohibits the legislature from altering or even abolishing certain rights 
which existed at common law. In fact, in Berry, we specifically stated that the 
legislature may eliminate or abrogate a cause of action entirely if there is sufficient 
reason and the elimination or abrogation "is not an arbitrary or unreasonable 
means [of] achieving the objective." Berry also makes it clear that article I, sec-
1 1 
tion 11 is not to be read as preserving every common law cause of action that may 
have existed prior to 1896. 
Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 871 (Utah 1988). 
Elimination of a cause of action is arbitrary or unreasonable if (1) there is no clear 
social evil to be eliminated, or (2) elimination of the remedy is not an arbitrary or unrea-
sonable means for addressing the social evil. Berry ex rel Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
717 P.2d 670, 681 (Utah 1985). 
Here, the evil to be eliminated is the stigmatization of the disabled and of un-
wanted children in general The State has a compelling interest in assuring that individu-
als afflicted with physical or mental deformities are not viewed or treated as second-class 
citizens or as having less worth or fewer rights than "normal" people. 
A claim that a child should not have been born labels the child as unwanted. Pro-
viding a remedy having the force of law to compensate the parents for the burden of 
raising that unwanted child places the imprimatur of the State on lhat label, in effect tell-
ing the child and those like him or her that society would prefer not to be burdened with 
"defective" children. Moreover, allowing such a claim to proceed because the child is 
"defective" runs directly counter to society's concerted efforts to provide the disabled 
with equal rights and equal access. By what standard is one to judge whether a child or 
its parents would be better off if the child had not lived? Does the claim not require the 
parent to aver that the child is loved less because it is "defective," or that the parents can-
not be happy without a "perfect" child? 
Claims requiring the parents to allege that they did not want a child are: 
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an insidious attack on the family unit since the unwanted child will someday learn 
that his parents did not want him and in fact went to court to force someone to pay 
for the medical and hospital costs attendant to his birth, the wages they lost when 
he was born, and the pain and suffering and "emotional trauma" of his mother. 
The emotional harm inflicted by this cruel knowledge will be carried by the child 
throughout his or her life. Who is going to compensate this unwanted child in 
damages for his "emotional trauma" in being born, through no fault of his own, to 
parents who did not want him and considered the advent of his birth not as a 
"blessed event," but as damage to them? 
C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 523 (Utah 1988) (Howe, J., dissenting). 
Such views are contrary to contemporary views of the value of life: 
[They] would be incompatible with contemporary views concerning one of 
life's most precious gifts - the birth of a normal and healthy child. We are loath to 
adopt a rule, the primary effect of which is to encourage, indeed reward, the par-
ents' disparagement or outright denial of the value of their child's life. 
Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634, 641 (1984). 
The Legislature was well within the boundaries of reasonableness in concluding 
that such claims constitute a social evil. "Respect for life and the rights proceeding from 
it are at the heart of our legal system and, broader still, our civilization." Cockrum v. 
Baumgartner, 95 111. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385, 389, cert, denied sub nom. Raja v. Michael 
Reese Hosp. & Med. Center, 464 U.S. (1983). The Legislature's declaration of purpose 
correctly invokes the public policy "to encourage all persons to respect the right to life of 
all other persons, regardless of age, development, condition or dependency." The prohi-
bition of a remedy based upon a claim that a child should not have been born directly and 
narrowly achieves that purpose. 
i 3 _ 
III. THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BECAUSE IT 
DOES NOT UNDULY BURDEN A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO 
CHOOSE ABORTION. 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the United States Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the "right of a woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and 
to obtain it without undue interference from the State.'9 Id. at 846 (emphasis added). 
"Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this 
decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause." Id. at 874. "Not all burdens on the right to decide whether to ter-
minate a pregnancy will be undue." Id. at 876. A burden is undue where it "has the pur-
pose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus." Id. at 877. 
The doctrine of Roe v. Wade "protects the woman from unduly burdensome inter-
ferences with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. In order 
for a state to be in violation of Roe v. Wade, the state must directly affect or im-
pose a significant burden on the woman's right to an abortion. Legislation which 
does not place a government obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to ter-
minate her pregnancy will not be deemed unconstitutional. 
Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, 424 Pa. Super. 549, 623 A.2d 816, 819 
' (1993) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.464, 473-74 (1977) and citing Harris v. McRae, 
448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)). 
A. The Plaintiffs Have Not Established State Action. 
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process only applies where the dep-
rivation of a constitutional right is by governmental "state action." Lugar v. Edmondson 
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Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982). Applying the fourteenth amendment, the Utah Su-
preme Court has held: 
The general test for determining whether state action is involved in a depri-
vation [is:] First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of a state-created 
right or privilege. Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person 
who may fairly be said to be a state actor. 
Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 795 P.2d 637, 640 (Utah 1990) (footnote omitted). 
Plaintiffs cannot establish state action. They claim that by extinguishing causes of 
action for wrongful birth and wrongful life, the Legislature encourages physicians to 
withhold accurate information, and that this in turn precludes women from choosing to 
abort their unborn child. That alleged causal link, however, is broken by the individual 
choices of the non-state actors involved in the decision. Plaintiffs' argument is that, by 
protecting the health care provider from liability for wrongful birth, the Act facilitates the 
provider's imagined ability to directly mislead the woman and thus impairs her ability to 
make an informed choice concerning abortion. Plainly, under those hypothetical circum-
stances (which do not exist in this case) the provider's individual actions cause the failure 
of choice, and no state action is involved. 
We conclude, therefore, that the legislative decision to preclude a cause of 
action for wrongful birth does not place a government obstacle in the path of a 
woman's right to choose to abort a fetus which she is carrying for whatever rea-
son. Her freedom to decide is not impaired by a statute which denies her the right 
to bring an action against the physician who has negligently failed to advise her 
correctly regarding the health of the fetus. "[Although government may not place 
obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not 
remove those not of its own creation." 
Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 424 Pa. Super. 549, 623 A.2d 816, 819 
(1993) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316). 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court declared constitutional a statute barring claims for 
wrongful birth, in Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986). 
The court stated, "[W]e do not believe that the due process and equal protection clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment apply in this case. Prerequisite to a possible violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is state action or involvement." Id. at 13 (citing Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)). The court continued, "How can it be argued that state ac-
tion is involved in this case? The relationship here is strictly between doctor and patient. 
The statute does not forbid the doctor to inform the patient of new tests and the risk they 
entail. It does not directly touch on the expectant mother's right to choose an abortion. 
Due process does not require that the state adopt regulations prohibiting purely private 
conduct." Id. (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)). 
The Act does not regulate or directly affect a woman's right to choose to have an 
abortion. It does not forbid doctors from informing patients about prenatal tests, the risks 
they entail and the results of any tests. The Act merely precludes claims such as this one 
that but for the mistakes of doctors in performing and reporting prenatal tests, a child 
would have been aborted prior to birth. Such a prohibition on civil claims is not state 
action. 
B. The Purpose of the Act is Not to Prevent Abortions. 
Plaintiffs assert that the Act violates due process because its purpose is to prevent 
abortions and to prevent a woman from becoming informed about the health of her un-
born child. The Legislature specifically set forth the purpose of the Act in § 78-11-23. 
Section 78-11-23 states, "The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of 
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this state to encourage all persons to respect the right to life of all other persons, regard-
less of age, development, condition or dependency, including all handicapped persons 
and all unborn persons." 
"When interpreting a statute, this Court's 'primary goal is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'" Boulder 
Mountain Lodge, Inc. v. Town of Boulder, 983 P.2d 570, 573 (Utah 1999) (quoting Evans 
v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998)). "'When faced with a question of statutory con-
struction, we look first to the plain language of the statute.'" C.T. ex rel Taylor v. John-
son, 977 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah 1999) (quoting Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 
P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted in original)). "'[C]ourts are not to infer 
substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must 
be based on the language used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to con-
form to an intention not expressed.'" Id. (quoting Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 
P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted in original)). "Only if that language is am-
biguous do we then turn to a consideration of legislative history and relevant policy con-
siderations." Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998). 
The stated purpose of the Act is clear and unambiguous. It is to encourage people 
to "respect the right to life of all other persons, regardless of age, development, condition 
or dependency, including all handicapped persons and all unborn persons." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-11-23. Nowhere does the Act state or even imply that its purpose is to prevent 
abortions or prevent a woman from becoming informed about the health of her unborn 
child. Because the purpose of the Act is clear and unambiguous, the Court may not look 
to its legislative history to rewrite it to include a purpose not expressed. 
Plaintiffs refer in their brief to so-called "legislative history" of the Act to bolster 
their claim that the Act had an unstated purpose of limiting abortion. This argument is 
unpersuasive on several levels. The sources cited are not legislative history. Rather, they 
are unsupported speculation and secondhand statements of individual legislators in the 
newspaper and in personal interviews. See Note, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: 
Analysis of the Causes of Action and the Impact of Utah's Statutory Breakwater, 1984 
Utah L. Rev. 833, 857-58 nn.152-153. Even if such sources were credible, they are an 
inappropriate source of legislative history in this case. Members of the Legislature voted 
on the statement of purpose set forth in the Act, not on floor statements or media state-
ments of individual legislators. Where the express statement of purpose is in the Act, is 
clear, and was voted on, it must be accepted over the clamor of individual politicians at-
tempting to obtain political advantage from their votes. 
C. The Act Does Not Have the Effect of Preventing a Woman From 
Obtaining an Abortion. 
Plaintiffs argue the Act has the effect of substantially obstructing a woman from 
exercising an informed decision to terminate her pregnancy by leaving doctors free to 
mislead women concerning their choices. That argument is incorrect, because there are 
other substantial penalties for doctors who engage in such conduct. Doctors are still 
subject to penalties for misrepresenting a patient's condition to the patient. The Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing may "revoke, suspend, restrict, place on pro-
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bation, issue a public or private reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license of any 
licensee . . . [if] the . . . licensee has engaged in unprofessional conduct." Utah Code 
Ann. §58-1-401(2). The Division may also assess administrative penalties of up to 
$10,000 for unprofessional conduct. Utah Code Ann. § 58-67-503(2) (citing § 58-67-
402(1)). "'Unprofessional conduct' means . . .violating . . . any generally accepted pro-
fessional or ethical standard applicable to an occupation or profession regulated under 
this title." Utah Code Ann. § 58-l-501(2)(b). It is a violation of a doctor's professional 
and ethical duties to make intentional misrepresentations in connection with patient care. 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the "substantial obstacle" argument in 
Edmonds v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital Radiology Associates of Western Pennsylva-
nia, 414 Pa. Super. 567, 607 A.2d 1083 (1992). In Edmonds, the plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting claims for wrongful birth. The 
Edmonds court ruled the statute did "not encourage either intentional misrepresentations 
or the negligent impartation of information relating to abortion rights" and, therefore, did 
not amount to state action. Id. at 1087. The court stated the statute did not regulate or 
directly affect a woman's right to choose to have an abortion but merely extinguished 
causes of action arising from a claim that but for the improper conduct of a medical pro-
vider, a child would have been aborted prior to birth. Id. Because physicians could be 
disciplined or their licenses revoked or suspended if they intentionally misrepresented to 
a woman the state of her health or that of her unborn child in an effort to infringe upon 
her abortion rights, the court ruled the statute did not encourage physicians to lie to their 
patients. Id. The court continued, "[W]e would be engaging in speculation were we to 
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assume that this extinguishment of liability encourages such improper [negligent] be-
havior." Id. at 1088. The court went on to rule the statute was constitutional. 
The Utah Legislature has by statute allowed physicians to be fined and their li-
censes revoked or suspended if they intentionally misrepresent the state of a woman's 
health or that of her unborn child to prevent her from having an abortion. These statutes 
impose severe consequences upon them for failure to do so, and thus provide sufficient 
protection to ensure to the best of the State's ability that doctors adequately inform their 
patients of the status of their medical condition. The statutory consequences are poten-
tially more severe than the consequences of civil litigation, prohibiting the doctor from 
ever practicing medicine in Utah again. Moreover, they would not be covered by mal-
practice insurance and would have more lasting effects than a monetary settlement. 
The Act's bar on wrongful birth claims does not constitute an undue burden on a 
woman's right to choose to have an abortion. Consequently, the Act is constitutional. 
IV. THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED TO 
THOSE THEY ALLEGE RECEIVE DIFFERENT TREATMENT 
AND THE ACT IS PROPERLY TAILORED TO ACHIEVE THE 
STATED INTEREST. 
Plaintiffs claim that the Act violates the Equal Protection clauses of the United 
States and Utah constitutions because it allows recovery for negligence associated with 
infringement on the right to prevent a child from being conceived, but prohibits recovery 
for infringement on the right to abort. The Equal Protection clauses of the United States 
and Utah constitutions require that similarly situated individuals be treated in a similar 
manner. State v. Fife, 911 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 923 P.2d 693 
-90-
(Utah 1996). ";[P]ersons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their cir-
cumstances were the same."9 Id. (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 
1984)). 
This Court in C.S. v. Nielson, 161 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988), clearly articulated the 
difference between cases involving contraception and cases involving abortion: 
Such language emphasizes the critical distinction between the types of 
claims sought to be precluded by [the Act] and the claim alleged in the instant 
case. Here, plaintiff sought a means to avoid pregnancy itself. Indeed, the injury 
she claims resulted from the fact that she became pregnant allegedly due to her 
physician's negligent counseling regarding a surgical procedure designed to pre-
vent her from being able to conceive. Clearly, "[a] person's decision not to con-
ceive a child and to undergo surgical sterilization should not be confused with 
one's decision to abort a child already conceived." In order for us to adopt defen-
dant's view, we must ignore established and proven principles of tort law as well 
as the fact that in this case and others like it, it is not the birth or life of the child, 
but rather "the pregnancy [of the mother] as a medical condition that gives rise to 
compensable damages and completes the elements for a claim of negligence." 
This we will not do. 
767 P.2d at 508 (footnotes omitted). 
Plaintiffs cannot claim they are similarly situated to individuals obtaining testing 
prior to conception or undergoing sterilization procedures. The plaintiffs in a wrongful 
pregnancy action never wanted to become parents. Their suit is based upon the alleged 
negligent performance of an actual sterilization or abortion procedure. Plaintiffs, how-
ever, wanted a child — just not one who was impaired. Because they wanted a child and 
took measures to bring one into this world, they are not in the same class as individuals 
who attempted to prevent conception altogether, and have no viable challenge on equal 
protection grounds. 
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The court in Hickman v Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986), 
reached the same result. The court reasoned: 
[T]he state has a rational basis for distinguishing a situation where a parent de-
cides to be sterilized and the doctor negligently performs the operation from one 
where the parents decide to assume certain well-known risks in childbearing and 
then want to sue the physician for the realization of the possible consequences. 
Most adults are fully aware of the risks of childbearing when the mother is over 30 
years old . . . These parents should not be allowed to take the risk and then sue the 
doctor for the consequences. 
396N.W.2datl4. 
Even if plaintiffs were similarly situated to individuals attempting to prevent a 
pregnancy, the Act is properly tailored to achieve the stated interest. Before conducting 
an equal protection analysis, the Court must determine the standard of review that ap-
plies. If a challenged classification involves a suspect class or infringes on a fundamental 
right, Utah courts apply a "strict scrutiny test" and uphold the classification if it "furthers 
a compelling state interest." State ex rel N.R. v. State, 967 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (citation omitted). If the challenged classification does not involve a suspect class 
or impinge on a fundamental right, courts apply a "rational basis test" and "will uphold 
the classification as long as it is rationally related to a valid legislative purpose." Id. (ci-
tation omitted). 
The purpose of the Act is to "respect the right to life of all other persons, regard-
less of age, development, condition or dependency, including all handicapped persons 
and all unborn persons," not to prevent abortions. The State's interest in protecting and 
promoting respect for the disabled is certainly a valid legislative purpose. It is also com-
pelling. "A compelling state interest is a 'paramount interest, one of the highest order.5" 
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Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1250 (Utah 1998) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963)). In this situation, the Act protects a child from being labeled better dead than 
alive. 
Various courts from other jurisdictions have articulated the importance of this in-
terest. For example, "Would claims be honored, assuming the breach of an identifiable 
duty, for less than a perfect birth? And by what standard or by whom would perfection 
be defined?" Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528, 533 (1985), cert 
denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986). "When will parents in those jurisdictions be allowed to 
decide that their child is so 'defective' that given a chance they would have aborted it 
while still a fetus and, as a result, then be allowed to hold their physician civilly liable? 
When a fetus is only the carrier of a deleterious gene and not itself impaired? When the 
fetus is of one sex rather than the other?" Id. at 535. "Judges and juries will have to de-
termine the degree of impairment that renders a child's nonexistence preferable to exis-
tence. Not only will such a judgment be unpalatable, but persons making this judgment 
can look only to their own feelings or fears of being handicapped in deciding the merits 
of the claim." Comment, The Trend Toward Judicial Recognition of Wrongful Life: A 
Dissenting View, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 473, 499 (1981) (footnote omitted). 
The State also has both a legitimate and compelling interest in protecting individu-
als afflicted with a physical or mental deformity from being stigmatized because of their 
condition, and particularly from having their own parents publicly assert it would have 
been better for the child never to have been born because of his or her condition. Cf Al-
len v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 755 (1984) ("There can be no doubt that [stigmatizing in-
jury often caused by racial discrimination] is one of the most serious consequences of 
discriminatory government action"). 
The only remaining question is whether the statute is properly tailored to achieve 
its stated purpose. For the reasons set forth in the discussion of the open courts provision, 
plaintiffs' argument fails. The Act is not only rationally related but narrowly tailored to 
achieve the State's interest in protecting children from stigma associated with their physi-
cal condition. It merely bars any claims parents and the child may make against others 
for the mere fact the child was born. It does not prohibit women carrying afflicted chil-
dren from aborting them because of their condition, and it does not impose any condi-
tions or limitations on the mother's choice. It does not preclude parents' actions against a 
doctor for causing a physical or mental deformity during gestation as a result of the doc-
tor's negligence. Thus, the Act is both rationally related and narrowly tailored to achieve 
the State's compelling interest. 
Plaintiffs are not similarly situated to those they claim receive favorable treatment. 
The Act directly promotes both a legitimate and compelling state interest. Consequently, 
plaintiffs' equal protection claim fails as a matter of law. 
V. PLAINTIFFS' INFORMED CONSENT CLAIM FAILS AS A 
MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE IT IS DEPENDENT UPON THEIR 
WRONGFUL BIRTH CLAIM FOR SUCCESS. 
Plaintiffs argue that their claim alleging negligent failure to inform Ms. Wood and 
Mr. Borman of the prenatal test results is separate and distinct from plaintiffs' wrongful 
birth and wrongful life claims. They allege that this cause of action is unaffected by the 
Act. They have neglected, however, to plead essential elements necessary to prove an 
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informed consent claim. Specifically, they fail to allege that the prenatal testing per-
formed on Ms. Wood carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing her or 
her unborn child serious harm, that the she was not informed of the substantial and sig-
nificant risk of harm, that she (judged by a reasonable person standard) would not have 
consented to the health care if she had been fully informed concerning the substantial and 
significant risk of harm associated with the health care, and that the unauthorized part of 
the health care proximately caused her personal injuries. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-5. 
On this basis alone, the lower court's dismissal of the informed consent claim was appro-
priate and should be affirmed. 
Plaintiffs' informed consent claim fails as a matter of law for other reasons, as 
well. The Act does not preclude claims bearing certain labels. Rather, it precludes reme-
dies based upon the premise that an abortion would have occurred but for the act or omis-
sion of another. Plaintiffs' informed consent claim is precluded because it is based on 
facts described in the Act. The assertion that but for the defendant's negligence, Ms. 
Wood would have aborted her unborn child, is critical to plaintiffs' claim. Without that 
assertion, there is no claim or, more specifically, there is no damage because the genetic 
disorder in the child was not the fault of the physician. It is the same claim as a cause of 
action for wrongful birth. 
Plaintiffs cite a Missouri state court decision allowing the mother of a child born 
with congenital abnormalities to assert a claim for failure to properly read and interpret 
prenatal tests and advise her of the results, despite the existence of a statute barring 
claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life. Shelton v. St. Anthony's Medical Ctr., 781 
S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1989). Utah has never recognized such a claim. The University respect-
fully argues that in light of the existence of the Act and its express purpose, it is not the 
prerogative of the courts to create a cause of action expressly barred by the Legislature. 
Such a judgment is better left to the Legislature, which has not only the resources to 
make such a determination but the responsibility, as well. Because the Legislature has 
not provided for an informed consent claim of this nature, plaintiffs' claim fails as a 
matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the University respectfully requests that this Court af-
firm the lower court's judgment. 
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